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Introduction
Groups symbols such as a flag, a Muslim veil, a T-shirt of a rock band or an expensive corporate style suit function in various ways as coordination devices. At the one hand, they reveal information about underlying heterogeneity. Strangers can form a reasonably accurate idea about one's socioeconomic background and tastes from a casual observation of one's clothing and lifestyle. At the other hand, symbols strengthen group identification and loyalty. By displaying the above symbols, one is met with initial sympathy by some strangers, and with aversion by others. Tajfel and Turner's (1979) famous 'minimal group experiment' shows that symbols can give rise to a differential sympathy or hostility towards strangers, even if these symbols do not reflect any underlying heterogeneity.
1 While these findings gave rise to an extensive literature and numerous replications, the underlying mechanisms are relatively poorly understood. Iannaccone (1992) presents an interesting interpretation of the role of symbols, in particular in cults and sects, as a solution for typical group problem: the underprovision of a club good, stems from the lack of (sufficient) internalization of the benefits of one's contribution for other group members. The standard solution in club theory is to levy membership fees, and use its revenues to subsidize contributions (see e.g. Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) ). But if such a formal scheme is unfeasible or undesirable, Iannaccone (1992) suggests that a cult or sect can 'tax' resources spent outside the group. If members contribute time to the club good, such a 'tax' takes the form of restrictions on members' clothing, diet, haircut or language, which impede social interactions with nonmembers. By sacrificing their capacity for social interactions outside the group, these typical idiosyncrasies of religious, political or subcultural groups help members to foster their group contributions.
The sacrifice of outside options to demonstrate commitment and sustain cooperation and group norms is documented by social scientists in a variety of contexts. Gambetta (2009, p.41 ) discusses how prisoners prove their reliability by taking prison tattoos on visible body parts, thus ruining their chances of an honest life. Gambetta (2009, p.19) equally describes how candidate members of Colombian youth gangs are to kill a friend or family member. Besides proving one's ability to murder, it also shatters gang members' fall back option for leaving the gang. Berman (2000) documents these sacrifice mechanisms for the case of ultra-orthodox Jews. Berndt (2007) shows how a membership of a distinct and despised ethnic or religious minority, and the implied lack of outside options, allowed e.g. 19th century Jewish peddlers to act as middlemen in high stake financial transactions. Shimizu (2011) models self-sacrifice in military and terrorist groups as a result of giving up individual autonomy. Aimone et al. (2013) find the possibility of sacrificing private outside options enhancing club good contributions in a VCM experiment.
Yet, the ability of symbols to discipline group members' behavior crucially depends on their damaging effect on outside options, i.e., on non-members' reactions to these symbols. The literature following Iannaccone (1992) typically takes a negative reaction to the symbols as exogenously given. While such reaction is inherent in some cases, such as killing family members, it is much less obvious for more arbitrary and minimal symbols, such as clothing or hair color. In this paper, we jointly derive symbol choices, the reactions to symbols and the resulting cooperation levels from a notion of equilibrium.
We study the role of symbols in the context of an infinitely repeated public goods game, with random matching, endogenous partnership termination and limited information flows. We consider an infinite population of homogeneous players, who differ ex ante only in a visible but payoff-irrelevant symbol (e.g. a colored hat). Players begin each round with one partner, with whom they play a stage game consisting of two phases. First, they play a public goods game. Second, upon observing the public goods game's outcome, both players simultaneously decide on terminating the partnership or not, and on changing their symbol at a certain cost, or not. Partnerships are exogenously broken with a small probability, and players whose partnership was terminated are randomly matched to another player whose partnership was terminated. Starting a new partnership, players have no information about their partner's past play, they only observe his symbol.
We characterize an efficient and segregating equilibrium of this game, in which players exert no effort in the public goods game if their partner bears a different symbol. Such heterogenous partnerships are immediately terminated. In partnerships which are homogeneous in terms of symbols, players exert the highest effort level which is incentive compatible. A failure to comply to the equilibrium effort level in a homogeneous partnership is punished with partnership termination, and thus implies in expectation a certain search time, before the players run into a new same symbol partner to start cooperating with. A such, players bearing a more scarce symbol expect a longer search for a cooperative partner after a partnership termination, and this sacrifice allows them to sustain higher cooperation levels.
This paper relates to a large literature on cooperation in infinitely repeated public goods games or prisoners dilemma games. The central question in this literature is how to constrain the continuation payoffs of defectors in order to bring cooperation on the equilibrium path, despite of defecting being the stage game's dominant strategy. However, the present setting excludes a large number of well-known mechanisms to sustain cooperation. First, endogenous partnership termination and random rematching excludes the entire class of personal enforcement mechanisms, in which cheating triggers a punishment by the victim. Because defectors can terminate a partnership before undergoing their punishment, the usual folk theorems and trigger strategy results do no apply. Second, the absence of information about a partner's past play in previous partnerships excludes community enforcement mechanisms, in which shirkers are identified and punished by other members of the population.
2 Third, even though the contagion mechanisms of Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) can sustain cooperation if players are randomly rematched and know only their own history of play, it is excluded in this setting by the continuum population. 2 Sustaining cooperation by punishments by other community members has been shown effective under various information assumptions by e.g. Greif (1993) , OkunoFujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) , Mailath and Morris (2000) or Takahaski (2010) .
3 In these equilibria, players defect in all their future partnerships if being cheated upon. If players are sufficiently patient, they are dissuaded from defecting by the foresight of triggering the eventually entire population to defect forever. In the present setting, a defection eventually infects at most countably many out of uncountable many players into defecting.
The literature has nevertheless advanced two mechanisms to sustain cooperation in the present restrictive setting. A first alternative relies on gradual trust-building or 'incubation'.
4 In these equilibria, players only engage into full cooperation in a partnership after a sufficiently long trust-building or 'incubation' phase, i.e., a number of rounds in which they defect or exert low effort. The prospect of a trust-building stage with a new partner suffices to deter players from cheating in the later stages of a partnership.
5 A second alternative relies on the presence of exogenous defectors in the population, giving a cooperating partner a sufficient scarcity value to discourage defection.
6 Ghosh and Ray (1996) show how cooperation in a public goods game is sustainable if the defectors' population share is neither too small nor too large. Adverse selection, due to the defectors always drawing a new partner while patient cooperators lock themselves into long term cooperative partnerships, makes that a small share of defectors poses a sufficient threat to sustain cooperation among patient players. Moreover, Ghosh and Ray (1996) demonstrate how their equilibrium satisfies 'bilateral rationality, i.e., is robust against bilateral renegotiation by of current partners.
In the present paper, we study a setting similar to Ghosh and Ray's (1996) repeated public goods game, but in which the part of the exogenous defectors is replaced by group symbols. We assume no preference heterogeneity, but derive that players act much like defectors towards others bearing a different symbol from the notion of a segregating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, players bearing different symbols face generically different incentives. In the spirit of Iannaccone (1992), players can thus sacrifice their outside options by bearing a more scarce symbol, which allows them to sustain higher cooperation levels. Finally, we also characterize the segregating equilibrium in terms of a parametrized criterion of renegotiation proofness, named ε-renegotiation proofness, which allows us to differentiate between the game's different equilibria.
The importance of payoff irrelevant group symbols for cooperation is also central in Eeckhout (2006) and Choy (2014). Eeckhout (2006) stud-4 See e.g. Datta (1996) , Kranton (1996 ), Eeckhout (2006 , Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) or Fujiwara-Greve et al. (2012. This approach also relates to the idea of 'starting small ' in Watson (1999 ' in Watson ( , 2002 , where the stakes of the game gradually increase with the partnership's age.
5 Deb and González-Díaz (2014) show how these results depend on the structure of the prisoner's dilemma stage game. Slight modifications in the payoff structure break down the standard results and imply a need for more sophisticated trust-building techniques.
6 Related mechnisms are also studied by e.g. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) and Schumacher (2013) .
ies the role of a public correlation device such as skin color in an infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma with endogenous partnership termination and limited information. Eeckhout compares a standard ('color-blind') incubation equilibrium to a 'segregation equilibrium', in which new partners of the same color start cooperating immediately, while other new partners play an incubation strategy. Eeckhout shows that color distributions exist for which the segregation equilibrium Pareto dominates the color-blind equilibrium.
Choy (2014) is the closest to our paper. He studies how segregation on the basis of visible group affiliations helps to sustain cooperation in an infinitely repeated public goods game. Choy assumes that players also know the group affiliation of their partners' previous partners, and that groups are hierarchically ranked. He characterizes a renegotiation proof segregating equilibrium, in which players refuse to interact with members of lower groups to protect their reputation. Preserving this reputation implies higher search costs upon partnership termination, which in turn helps to sustain more cooperation. Unlike Choy (2014), we assume no information about a partner's past play, and unlike Eeckhout (2006) and Choy (2014), finally, we understand symbols as a choice variable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The formal setting and equilibrium concept are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 discusses how symbols are helpful in sustaining cooperation by characterizing the efficient segregating equilibrium. In Section 4, we characterize the efficient segregating and other equilibria in terms of a parametrized version of renegotiation proofness, and we discuss the relation with various forms of chauvinistic preferences. The final Section concludes. All proofs and derivations are collected in a mathematical appendix.
Formal Setting
Assume a continuum of players. Time is indexed by t ∈ N, and all players share the same discount factor 0 ≤ δ < 1. Each player wears one publicly visible symbol out of a set of symbols S = {s i } i=1,...,n . Players start each round of the game with one partner. We call a partnership between two players homogeneous if both bear the same symbol, and call it heterogenous otherwise.
In each round of the game, partners first play a public goods game with their current partner. After observing the public goods game's outcome and inferring their partner's contribution, players decide on symbol change and partnership termination. The symbol switching cost of a player who starts a round t with symbol s i and ends it with symbol s j is denoted c t (i, j) , with c (.) ≥ 0 and c (i, j) = 0 if i = j. We assume that these switching costs are independent of t. Partnerships are exogenously terminated with probability λ ∈ (0, 1]. Otherwise, both players choose whether or not to continue the partnership, which is denoted by l ∈ {0, 1}, where l = 1 means continuing the partnership. A partnership ends if at least one of the partners wishes to terminate it. If their partnership is terminated, players randomly draw a new partner from the set of players whose partnership was terminated. Of course, this assumption of exogenous partnership termination ensures that drawing a new partner is uninformative about past behavior on the equilibrium path. When meeting a new partner, players do not observe his past behavior, but only see his symbol.
We first characterize the public goods game. In this game, both partners choose a level of efforts e ∈ R + . A player who contributes e while his partner contributes e obtains a stage payoff π (e, e ). If π k and π kk denote partial derivative of π w.r.t. argument k and arguments k and k , respectively, then the following restrictions on the public goods game technology are imposed:
Condition 1 Let π be a twice continuously differentiable function such that:
1. (Public goods game) π 1 (e, .) < 0 for all e > 0, π 2 > 0 and π 1 (e, e)+ π 2 (e, e) > 0 for all e ∈ R + , 2. (Boundedness) π (e, e) is bounded for all e ∈ R + , and ∃γ > 0 such that π 2 > γ, 3. (Initial condition) normalize π (0, 0) = 0, while π 1 (0, .) = 0, and π 11 (0, 0) < 0.
The first part of condition 1 ensures that π represents a public goods game: payoffs are decreasing with own effort, increasing with the partner's effort, and a symmetric increase in both partners' efforts increases the payoff of both. As such, coordinating on a higher effort level is always mutually beneficial. The next two parts of condition 1 impose some regularity conditions to ensure that the players' problem and behavior is always well defined. Part 2 of condition 1 bounds the benefits of symmetric efforts, implying that lim e→∞ π 1 (e, e) + π 2 (e, e) = 0, and bounds marginal benefits of the partner's efforts away from zero. Part 3 of condition 1 normalizes π to be zero in absence of any contribution, and ensures that our problem is well defined near zero. The following simple example shows a public goods game technology which satisfies the above condition, and which will serve as a closed form example in the remainder of this text.
Example 1 The payoff function
π (e, e ) = 1 + e − e − 1 1 + e satisfies condition 1, as
2 > 0 for all e ∈ R + . Moreover, π (e, e) = e 1+e is bounded from above by 1, π (0, 0) = 0, π 1 (0, .) = 0 and π 2 = 1.
The information of a player at the beginning of round t, denoted h t ∈ H t , consists of the fundamentals of the game, the symbol of his current partner, and their history of play in the current partnership. R + × S R + specifies a triplet (e t , l t , s t ) for all t and possible information sets h t .
8 The first element specifies how much effort to exert given the symbol of the current partner and the history of play. The second element specifies, for each h t , a termination decision for all possible effort levels of the partner e t :
Similarly, the last element specifies a symbol switching decision as a function of the partner's effort e t . We say that a strategy is public, if it is conditioned only on the partners public information.
9
Players evaluate a strategy by considering the expected future payoff streams to which a strategy is expected to give rise, i.e., they wish to maximize
Hence, these information assumptions exclude players to condition behavior on their play in past partnerships. At the one hand, note that players run into one of their past partners again with zero probability, because even for t → ∞, players have met at most countably many out of uncountably many others. At the other hand, our equilibrium concept excludes players to condition behavior on private histories of play.
8 As usual, Y X represents the set of all mappings from X to Y. Note that this formulation is equivalent with players making termination and symbol switching decisions at the second phase of round t in function of an intermediate history of play, which comprises h t and the effort strategies in round t's public goods game, because the partner's effort choice constitutes the only new information at this intermediate stage of round t.
9 Note that allowing players to condition their choices on their private histories of play, i.e., their play in previous partnerships, would introduce asymmetric information in the game. This would complicate the analysis considerably, as it would require us to introduce beliefs about a partner's private information, and have strategies equally depending on these beliefs. in which the expectation operator E indicates the expectations over all possible future histories of play and symbols of partners to which a strategy σ may lead, given the strategies of other players as well as the stochastic processes of partnership termination and formation. We study the stationary perfect public equilibria (PPE) of this game, i.e., profiles of public strategies which yield for all t and all h t as Nash equilibrium for round t and all the consecutive rounds.
Because two players bearing the same symbol face the same incentives, the efficient segregating PPE is symmetric in the sense that two players in a homogeneous partnership exert the same effort. In the remainder of this Section, we proceed in steps to characterize the efficient segregating PPE.
Let p i denote the stationary share of all players who start a round with a new partner who bear symbol s i . In the efficient segregating PPE, the expected continuation value of an s i player in a homogeneous partnership is recursively defined as:
in which w i (ē i ) is the expected continuation value of an s i player starting the round with a randomly drawn partner:
Hence, in equilibrium both players get a stage payoff π (ē i ,ē i ) in a homogeneous s i partnership, after which their partnership survives to the next round with probability 1 − λ, and is terminated otherwise. In case of termination, the s i players immediately draw a new s i partner with probability p i , in which case they start cooperating. Otherwise they get stage payoff zero, terminate the partnership, and start the next round again with a randomly drawn partner.
Incentive compatibility requires that an s i player is not worse off when providing the equilibrium effort levelē i , rather than defecting on his partner and starting anew with a new partner in the next period, i.e.,
while efficiency implies that (3) must be satisfied with equality. Solving (3) with equality forē i , we obtain the following effort levels in the efficient segregating PPE.
Proposition 1 In the efficient segregating PPE, the equilibrium effort in homogeneous partnershipsē i uniquely solves
such thatē i is a left-continuous and strictly decreasing function of p i and λ, and a right-continuous and strictly increasing function of δ.
Hence, players with more scarce symbols face a worse outside option, and this allows them to sustain higher effort levels. Moreover, effort levels are increasing with the 'effective' discount factor δ (1 − λ), i.e., if the value of a current homogeneous partnership increases because players become more patient or because the expected longevity of their present partnership increases.
Example 2 In the closed form example, π(e,e) π(0,e) = 1 1+e strictly decreases with e, such thatē i is a continuous function of p i . The equilibrium effort levels areē
.
We can now easily characterize the relation between p i and the share of the population bearing symbol s i . Let x i t denote the proportion of s i players that start round t with a new partner, and note that x i t follows a simple Markov dynamic:
Symbol s i players currently in a homogeneous partnership only have to draw a new partner if their partnership was exogenously terminated (with probability λ), moreover a further proportion of 1 − (1 − λ)p i from the fraction of s i -players who had to draw a new partner in the previous period will have to do this in the next. In the stationary equilibrium, it must be that
i , such that we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 In the efficient segregating PPE, a share
Hence, s i players spend in equilibrium on average a fraction x i of their time with noncooperative partners, and this share of their time going to waste increases with the probability of break-up λ and decreases probability of randomly drawing another s i player that is also searching a new partner. This longer expected waiting time is precisely what allows players bearing a scarce symbol to sustain higher levels of cooperation. The share of the population bearing symbol s i , finally, is then
, and this share exceeds
players draw on average more often a new partner than the population average, such that they are overrepresented in the set of players drawing a new partner, i.e., p i overstates their overall population share. Note that this selection effect differs from the adverse selection effect in Ghosh and Ray (1996) , where the myopic types are overrepresented in the set of players drawing a new partner, because patient players lock themselves into long-term cooperative partnerships, unlike myopic players. In the efficient segregating PPE, the selection effect softens any asymmetries in symbol frequencies. Because they spend more time looking for a same symbol partner, players bearing a scarce symbol have more chance finding a same symbol partner in the pool of players looking for a new partner than in the population at large. In the next Section, we show other symbol-dependent PPE can exhibit the opposite selection effect.
Players bearing scarce symbols can commit to higher efforts because of a longer expected search time, but only if they can be trusted not to switch to another symbol after a break-up. As such, the matrix of symbol switching costs (c t (i, j)) i,j=1,...,n determines which vectors of symbol frequencies p are compatible with an efficient segregating PPE. A player can decide to unilaterally switch symbol in different circumstances: in a homogeneous partnership, in a homogeneous partnership while cheating on his partner or before drawing a new partner. The first possibility is dominated by the second: a player in a homogeneous s i partnership who exertsē i and then switches symbol without not breaking up, will face a partner exerting zero effort and breaking up the partnership in the next round, 11 and can thus do strictly better by exerting zero effort, switching symbol and terminating the partnership himself. Clearly, the two latter possibilities of switching symbols are equivalent. An s i player in a homogeneous partnership will not shirk and unilaterally switch to a symbol s j if
Substituting (3) satisfied with equality into (6) , we obtain the following inequality, which also characterizes symbol switching when starting the next round with a new partner.
Proposition 3 In the segregating PPE, no s i players switch to symbol
The symbols frequencies compatible with the segregating PPE thus depend on the switching costs and on the shape of the (discounted) expected continuation values when starting with a randomly drawn new partner. Using (1), (2) and (3) , we write
The following lemma characterizes the shape of w i (ē i ) as a function of p i .
Lemma 1 In the efficient segregating PPE, w i (ē i ) is a left continuous function of p i , which decreases at any discontinuity and is such that
Moreover, where
Hence, the matrix of symbol switching costs imposes a bound on the maximal difference in continuation values with a randomly drawn partner. The continuation value of s i players with a new randomly drawn partner approaches zero for extreme values of p i . If p i → 1, the almost certainty of finding a new s i partner in the next round prevents them from committing to significant effort levels. If p i → 0, then the inability of finding a new s i partner after a partnership termination drives w i (ē i ) to zero, despite of s i players being able to sustain the highest possible effort level in a homogenous partnership, which we denotẽ
Hence,ẽ is the effort level that can only be sustained by partners who know they will never again find a cooperative partner after the termination of their present partnership. For future reference, we define e * and p * as following:
Hence, for all p i up to p * , an increase in p i implies a higher continuation value of s i players with a random new partner, because the losses in terms of sustainable efforts are more than compensated by the better chances of finding a new s i partner after a break-up. Bearing a very scarce symbols is therefore not necessarily desirable. Players have no desire to switch unilaterally to switch to a very scarce symbol. However, very scarce symbols can exist in equilibrium for different reasons. First, high switching costs prevent players to switch to more common symbols. This can e.g. be the case if the group symbols under consideration are ethnic markers, or to a lesser extent language or religion. Caselli and Coleman (2013) argue that conflicts develop particularly often along ethnic divides, because ethnic markers cannot easily be switched by members of the losing side. Here, immutable symbols facilitate the existence of small groups with an extremely high willingness to contribute to the group's goals. Besides symbols which are physically hard to switch, such as skin color, this should equally apply to e.g. religion, where religious people may be extremely unwilling to give up their beliefs in face of an eternal afterlife. Second, even in the presence of very low switching costs, very small groups can exist in equilibrium if all other symbols have extreme frequencies. For instance, if c (.) = 0, we must have w j (ē j ) = w i (ē i ) for all i, j in equilibrium. For finitely many symbols, this is compatible with a p i → 0 if almost the entire population bears another symbol s j , while all other symbol frequencies equal p i or zero.
In our closed form example, w i (ē i ) is much more well-behaved.
Example 3 In our closed form example,
is a continuous and strictly concave function of e, with a unique maximum at e * = 1
. Figure ? ? depicts p * as a function of δ (1 − λ) for our closed form example. dtbpFU3.8891in1.9069in0ptClosed form example: p * as a function of δ (1 − λ) .
We conclude our characterization of the efficient segregating PPE with the following existence result.
Proposition 4 If π satisfies condition 1, then for all matrices of symbol switching costs c a vector (p i ) i=1,...,n can be found such that an efficient segregating PPE exists.
The proof of proposition 4 relies on the fact that the effort levels in proposition 1 are well defined if condition 1 is satisfied, demonstrates the subgame perfection of the efficient segregating PPE argues that proposition 3 is always satisfied for uniform symbol frequencies.
Other equilibria and renegotiation
The efficient segregating PPE is but one out of many PPE. We first consider the family of 'symbol-blind' PPE, in which strategies are not conditioned on symbols. Clearly, PPE in which players never exert positive effort always exist. Besides, the main candidates for a symbol-blind PPE with positive efforts involve a form of gradual trust-building or incubation in the present setting. In these equilibria, equilibrium efforts depend on the age of a partnership, denoted τ ∈ N. In the early rounds of a partnership, equilibrium efforts are low, and the prospect of facing these low continuation values in a new partnership enables partners to sustain high efforts in a later rounds. Thus, a symmetric incubation PPE is characterized by a sequence (e τ ) τ =0,1,2,... which satisfies infinitely many constraints, such that for all τ = 0, 1, 2, ...:
j (π (e j+τ , e j+τ ) − π (e j−1 , e j−1 )) ≥ 0.
(7) The incentive constraint in (7) requires for all τ that the expected future benefits of being τ +1 rounds further in a partnership exceed the benefits of shirking in the τ -th round. Efficiency then implies maximizing
subject to (7) . This characterization illustrates that finding gradual symbol-blind equilibria can be quite tedious in the present public goods game setting, and that finding efficient equilibria will be very difficult.
Moreover, Gosh and Ray (1996) show that gradual trust-building equilibria are vulnerable to renegotiation by current partners. To characterize renegotiation by current partners in more detail, we introduce a parametrized version of renegotiation proofness, called ε-renegotiation proofness, which bounds the 'size' of a renegotiation from above, and encompasses standard notions of renegotiation proofness as a special case. We define the distance between two strategies σ and σ as
in which d (.) represents for simplicity a metric which is strictly increasing with respect to the differences in efforts, measured by the Euclidian metric, and differences in termination decisions and symbol switching, which are both measured by a discrete metric. We then define ε-renegotiation proofness w.r.t. bilateral deviations by current partners as following.
Definition 2 (ε-renegotiation proofness) A PPE in pure strategies is ε-renegotiation proof w.r.t. bilateral deviations by current partners if no pair of current partners can mutually benefit from a incentive compatible joint deviation, such that for each player's equilibrium strategies σ and deviating strategies σ , we have
Note that if ε → ∞, ε-renegotiation proofness reduces to Ghosh and Ray's (1996) criterion of bilateral rationality, albeit without its restriction to players who have not deviated in their past arrangements with each other. This parametrization allows us to distinguish better between different kinds of bilateral renegotiations.
We first consider the 'symbol-blind' equilibria.
Proposition 5 For all ε > 0, only PPE in which effort levels are constant with respect to the age of the partnership τ satisfy ε-renegotiation proofness. Symbol-blind PPE generically never satisfy ε-renegotiation proofness.
This vulnerability of gradual trust-building equilibria to bilateral deviations by current partners was shown by Ghosh and Ray (1996) , and naturally extends to the present case of marginal joint deviations. By fixing what players can expect from a new partnership, the equilibrium effort sequence e τ fixes the same outside option for all players, independent of the age of their current partnership. If it makes high efforts enforceable in later rounds of a partnership, then these high efforts are equally enforceable in the first round. As long as all others play the equilibrium strategies, two current partners can mutually improve themselves by jointly deviating higher efforts in the first round of their partnership, up to the point where they exert the highest sustainable efforts. Hence, allowing for even the smallest joint deviations implies that equilibrium efforts should be independent of the partnership age. The non-existence of ε-renegotiation proof PPE for any ε is then immediate. If the constant equilibrium efforts are high, then they violate incentive compatibility. If they are low, then they constitute a bad outside option, giving rise to bilateral deviations to higher efforts. An ε-renegotiation proof symbol-blind PPE typically only exists if δ(1 − λ) = 0, i.e., if players effectively play a sequence of one shot public goods games because they are perfectly myopic or because all partnerships are terminated after each round.
To what extent is the efficient segregating PPE ε-renegotiation proof? First, the arguments raised against the symbol-blind PPE imply that ε-renegotiation proofness requires Pareto optimality. If equilibrium efforts in homogeneous partnerships are symmetric, then they satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint with equality. However, ε-renegotiation proofness does not preclude asymmetric PPE, in which one partner's efforts are on the incentive compatibility constraint and the other's efforts are strictly below. It is not obvious how such asymmetric strategies should be implemented in a segregating PPE, in which both partners in a homogeneous partnership are ex ante identical.
Not all efficient segregating PPE satisfy ε-renegotiation proofness. An efficient segregating PPE can violate ε-renegotiation proofness for different reasons: because of bilateral deviations in homogeneous partnerships or in heterogenous partnerships.
Proposition 6 For all ε > 0, an efficient segregating PPE is ε-renegotiation proof w.r.t. bilateral deviations in homogenous partnerships ifē i ≥ e * for all i, that is, if p i ≤ p * for all i.
Hence, the efficient segregating PPE is robust against bilateral deviations of any size if all symbols are sufficiently scarce. Figure ? ? illustrates this maximal p * as a function of δ (1 − λ) for our closed form example. It shows that in the closed form example, 4 symbols suffice to guarantee the existence of an efficient segregating PPE which is robust against joint deviations of any size in homogenous partnerships if δ (1 − λ) ≤ 0.88, while 3 symbols suffice if δ (1 − λ) < 0.75. The intuition for this result is the following. If two s i players consider a joint deviation to higher efforts, their outside option remains constant at w i (ē i ), because all other players are assumed to stick to their equilibrium strategy. From (1), (2) and (3) , and keeping w i (ē i ) fixed, we see that an effort level e satisfies incentive compatibility if
where (8) is satisfied with equality for e =ē i . Ifē i ≥ e * , the left hand side of (8) decreases by construction with e. In this case, two players in a homogenous partnership cannot credibly commit to a higher effort level thanē i , because their outside option w i (ē i ) is too high compared to the relative benefits of continuing to cooperate and shirking. Forē i < e * , the difference between the benefits of cooperation and defection can be increasing, allowing two same symbol players to commit to a joint deviation to higher efforts. Note, finally, that the above generic non-existence of an ε-renegotiation proof symbol-blind PPE can be understood as an instance of this result, i.e., for the case p i = 1.
A second kind of bilateral deviations concerns cooperation in heterogenous partnerships. Consider the case of a pair of s i and s j players, and assume without loss of generality that p i ≤ p j . Clearly, joint deviations to efforts aboveē j are not credible, because they fail to satisfy incentive compatibility for the s j player. The s i player should thus settle less efforts than his equilibrium efforts in homogeneous partnerships, but both players will nevertheless be tempted into cooperation to avoid waiting for a homogeneous partnership. Because cooperation in heterogenous partnerships requires a deviation in termination decisions and a deviation from zero efforts, this is where the parametrization of ε-renegotiation proofness has a bite. Letê (ε) denote the maximal effort allowed in a deviation of size ε which also deviates in the termination decision. Note thatê (.) is well defined by the assumptions imposed on d (.) and π. Now ε constrains the temptation of heterogenous cooperation, up to the point whereê (ε) =ē j , after which further increases in ε do not bind. An s i player cannot credibly commit to deviate to cooperating at effort levelê (ε) if
If (9) is satisfied, thenê (ε) is too low to make the deviation into cooperation in a heterogenous partnership incentive compatible. In this case, players would prefer to defect and wait for a homogenous partnership to cooperate at higher effort levels. Note that w i (ē i ) strictly decreases with p forē i > e * by lemma 1, such that we can definep (ε) as the infimum of the set of p i 's for which (9) is satisfied 13 , and state the following result.
Proposition 7
The efficient segregating PPE is ε-renegotiation proof if p i ≤ p * for all i and p i >p (ε).p (ε) strictly increases with ε and this up to the point whereê (ε) = e * . For higher ε, no efficient segregating PPE satisfies ε-renegotiation proofness.
In our closed form example,p (ε) takes a simple form.
Example 4 In the closed form examplep (ε) solves (9) with equality, i.e.,ê
This means that p
Hence, except for the trivial case where δ (1 − λ) = 0, ε-renegotiation proofness for all values of ε > 0 is violated by all of the above PPE: perpetual non-cooperation, symbol-blind gradual trust-building and the efficient segregating PPE. It seems unlikely that any PPE satisfies this strongest form of ε-renegotiation proofness in the present setting. However, whereas the former symbol-blind PPE violate ε-renegotiation proofness for all values of ε > 0, the efficient segregating PPE only violates ε-renegotiation proofness if ε is too large.
Of course, the principal reason why the efficient segregated PPE is robust with respect to sufficiently small joint deviations by current partners, unlike symbol-blind PPE, lies in the radically different equilibrium efforts in homogeneous and heterogenous partnerships. Restrictions on the size of joint deviations constrain in particular the profitability of deviations to cooperation in heterogenous partnerships. In this sense, 13 Note that the inequality in (9) where the right hand side is replaced by w j ē j , is not sufficient to give the result in Proposition 7. However, (9) is amply sufficient. The weakest condition that one should impose is an upper boundê (ε) on efforts in such a deviation, whereê (ε) is characterized as the supremum over e such that there does not exist a positive y which still satisfies the following:
π(e−y,e) 1−δ(1−λ) − π (0, e) ≥ w j ē j and π(e,e−y)
restrictions to sufficiently small deviations can be understood as equivalent to unbounded renegotiation proofness in a model where other factors impede heterogenous cooperations, such as distrust towards players bearing a different symbol, a social stigma of heterogenous cooperation or a disutility cost of cooperation in heterogenous partnerships.
Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010) model how the appreciation for diversity ('tolerance') evolves, by considering how parents socialize their children by dividing a unit of 'symbolic' valuation over different types people, e.g. different professions, sexual orientations or ethnicities. Their offspring's later evaluation of their own life then depends on how this distribution of valuations matches their own profession, sexual orientation or frequent interaction with other ethnicities. Corneo and Jeanne show that parents choose a narrow distribution of valuations (intolerance) in static and predictable environments. This maximizes their offspring's expected valuation of their own life, but can also induce them to avoid certain professional choices or interactions at the cost of foregoing economic opportunities. In dynamic environments, parents choose to raise their offspring in tolerance.
The present paper adds a second rationale for intolerance. If cooperation is sustained by segregation and if it's sustainability is at risk because of the possibility of heterogenous cooperation, then certain groups can choose to promote intolerance, i.e., stimulate member to develop a disutility from cooperating with players bearing a different symbol. Assume that a round of cooperation in a heterogenous partnership comes at a disutility cost ∆ ≥ 0, such that a player receives stage payoff π (e, e ) − ∆ − c (i, j) from a round in which he exerts strictly positive effort in a heterogenous partnership. Define then a threshold value,∆, where:
in order to state the following result.
Proposition 8 If efficient segregating PPE ε-renegotiation proof for some ε, then it is ε-renegotiation proof for all ε > 0 if all players suffer a disutility ∆ where
>∆ in each stage of heterogenous cooperation.
If e * represents a globally maximizes w i (ē i ) and p i = p * for all i, then ∆ = 0, and any ∆ > 0 suffices to make the efficient segregating PPE ε-renegotiation proof for all ε > 0. However, to avoid bilateral deviations to heterogenous cooperation between s i and s j players, if suffices only one of both partners is intolerant. More generally, if only a share s i players have such intolerant preferences and if these preferences are private information, then a relatively small share of intolerant players with a sufficiently high ∆ can be a more effective deterrent of heterogenous cooperation. The possiblity of being defected upon by an intolerant player, and suffering a negative stage payoff, can be quite effective in preventing players to commit to a joint deviation in heterogenous cooperation. Terrorism can thus be rationalized in the present framework as using the power of mass media to suggest that a share of Muslims has intolerant preferences. A sufficiently large share of one group coming to believe in the existence of a share of intolerant players in the other group can already suffice to preclude all players from credibly commiting to heterogenous cooperation. If Islamic State or Al Qaeda change how all Muslims are perceived by sufficiently many people in the West, then their activities facilitate the enforcement of cooperation and social norms in Muslim communities Western countries.
Choy (2014) shows how reputational concerns can discourage joint deviations to heterogenous cooperation in a repeated public goods game setting with endogenous partnership termination, in which players observe the group affiliations of their partners' previous partners. Choy characterizes an equilibrium in which identifiable groups are hierarchically ordered, and in which members of higher groups protect their reputation by refusing any contact with members of lower groups, which in turn ensures a sufficiently low outside option to sustain cooperation.
The above considerations about ε-renegotiation proofness assumed strategy profiles and joint deviations without symbol switching. Yet, the possibility of joint deviations also affects symbol switching. Assume again a new partnership between an s i and an s j player, with p i < p j . Where unilateral symbol switching is excluded by Proposition 3 if the switching costs exceed the difference continuation values |w j (ē j ) − w i (ē i )|, allowing for joint deviations allows current partners, to jointly deviate by continuing the partnership and having one switching symbol. After this joint deviation, they continue cooperating in a now homogeneous partnership at equilibrium effort levels. Note that this joint deviation qualifies as a small renegotiation if metric d puts little weight on changes in termination and symbol switching decisions, because it requires no changes in effort decisions. In this case, ε-renegotiation proofness imposes additional restrictions on the symbol frequencies, or on the matrix of symbol switching costs c. Consider again a p i small, entailing high effortsē i in homogeneous partnerships. If players can jointly deviate in termination and symbol switching decisions, then they can circumvent the high search costs of finding another s i player, thus makingē i unsustainable. Therefore, a small p i is in this case only viable in an ε-renegotiation proof efficient segregating PPE if the symbol switching costs c (i, .) are sufficiently high, to avoid s i players leaving the group as before, and if c (., i) is sufficiently high to avoid players moving into the group of s i players by means of joint deviations. Moreover, whereas uniform zero symbol switching costs, c (.) = 0, are compatible with an efficient segregating PPE if we consider unilateral symbol switching only, e.g. if p i = p for all i, allowing for joint deviations in termination and symbol switching decisions always requires strictly positive switching costs. To see this, note that an s j player is not willing to switch to s i in a joint deviation if
which can be arranged into an inequality
Clearly, λ + (1 − λ) δ + 1−δ p i > 1 for all p i < 1, such that this inequality represents the seduction of immediate cooperation: without switching costs and if players only cooperate in homogeneous partnerships, one player is always willing to switch to his partners symbol in a heterogenous partnership by means of a joint deviation, in order to evade the search for a homogenous partnership. Thus, allowing for joint deviations in termination and symbol switching decisions implies that cooperation can only be sustained if symbols switching is costly.
We conclude this Section by considering another family of efficient symbol-dependent PPE. Consider a PPE in which players only exert effort in a heterogenous partnership with one particular other symbol. E.g., the s i players only exert positive efforts when partnered with an s j player, and vice versa. Of course, this equilibrium is largely equivalent to the efficient segregating PPE if p i = p j . Otherwise, say if p i < p j , efficiency no longer implies symmetry in cooperative partnerships. If both players exert efforts on the incentive compatibility constraint, then the s j is worse off than the s i player for several reasons. First, the s j player, bearing the more frequent symbol, can credibly commit to higher efforts than the s i player. This higher effort level makes him worse off than his partner and than he would be if both exerted the highest incentive compatible effort of the s i player. Second, the more frequent symbol s j player on average faces a longer search time for an s i partner, which constitutes his ability to commit to a higher efforts. Third, this selection effect now makes the vector of p's exacerbate differences in symbol frequencies at the population level, rather than smoothening them as in the efficient segregating PPE (see proposition 2). For all these reasons, the conditions for the existence and ε-renegotiation proofness of such a PPE are much more stringent than for the efficient segregating PPE, i.e., allow for less differences in symbols frequencies and smaller joint deviations.
Conclusion
By inducing segregation, payoff irrelevant symbols can help to sustain cooperation in an infinitely repeated public goods game with endogenous partnership termination and no information about a partner's past play. If players only cooperate with partners bearing the same symbol, then the consequent search for a new homogenous partnership constrains the continuation value after a defection. Because a more scarce symbol implies on average a longer search for a homogeneous partnership, it also enables players to sustain higher efforts. This understanding of symbols inducing a sacrifice of outside options is closer to Iannaccone's (1992) club theoretic analysis than e.g. Eeckhout's (2006) , where players eventually cooperate with all others after an incubation period and symbols allow for Pareto improvements upon this incubation equilibrium by serving as a public correlation devices. At the same time, the reaction to symbols which pose no intrinsic impediment to out-group interactions (e.g. clothing, hairstyles, veils) is fixed by a notion of equilibrium, where the reaction this kind of symbols is typically exogenously assumed in Iannaccone's (1992) club theoretic setting. Ghosh and Ray (1996) show that equilibria featuring a gradual increase of efforts throughout partnerships are vulnerable to bilateral renegotiation. As long as others play their equilibrium strategy of low initial cooperation, providing thus the incentives to sustain cooperation, two partners can benefit from jointly deviating to immediate cooperation. In the present setting, the efficient segregating equilibrium is equally vulnerable to such joint deviations, but satisfies a weaker parametrized version of renegotiation proofness, ε-renegotiation proofness, as long a joint deviations are not too big. Symbol-blind equilibria, at the other hand, fail to satisfy ε-renegotiation proofness even for the smallest joint deviations.
Although arbitrary at first sight, the restriction to sufficiently small joint deviations mainly affects joint deviations to cooperation in heterogenous partnerships, and can as such be understood as a reduced form of a model with other obstacles to heterogenous cooperation. The present analysis thus offers an additional perspective on the rationale for intolerant preferences, as analyzed in Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010) . Communities can encourage intolerant preferences, by which players suffer an intrinsic disutility cost from cooperating with partners bearing a different symbol, in order to enforce cooperation and norm adhesion. In this context, it is worth noting that robustness against joint deviations to heterogenous cooperation does not require all players to object to heterogenous cooperation. Players cannot credibly commit to a joint deviation to heterogenous cooperation if one of the two players faces such objections, or even if players are uncertain about whether a partner bearing a different symbol may face such objections. This suggests an interpretation of terrorist attacks, and xenophobe discourses of conservative politicians, as exploiting the power of mass media to cast doubt on the true preferences of members of another community. If sufficiently many members in one community doubt the true intentions of the other, this impedes both players to committing to cooperation in a heterogenous partnership, impeding integration between the different communities and facilitating the preservation of traditional community norms.
A group symbol of particular interest in this context is the Muslim veil, amongst others because of the controversy surrounding the legal ban on veiling in French public schools, and the debates about similar measures in many Western European countries. One principal motivation for such measures is the integration and emancipation of Muslim women in Western countries.
14 However, Carvalho (2013) presents a compelling interpretation of veiling as facilitating the emancipation of Muslim women. By wearing a veil, Muslim women reduce their exposure to the temptations of Western society, and their community's beliefs that they might give in to such temptations, allowing them to seize the social and economic opportunities without social repercussions from their community. Carvalho argues that a ban on veiling can cause Muslim women to substitute veiling by segregation and a withdrawal from an integrated public life. The present paper adds to this line of reasoning, and presents a specific formal mechanism where Carvalho's analysis about a veil reducing temptation remains implicit. If a legal ban on veiling or merely the public debate about it makes wearing a veil more controversial, and thus casts more doubt in the majority population's mind about the true preferences of Muslim women, it will be harder for the latter to establish interactions outside their own community. In this fashion, debates about a ban, Salafist extremism as well as xenophobe Western politicians, contribute to the ability of Muslim communities to enforce traditional social norms upon their members.
We conclude with a final caveat about possible policy implications of the present analysis. Social norms and group cooperation can be both a source of emancipation and conflict, of creation and destruction of welfare. In light of the present analysis and abstracting from all other concerns, the welfare assessment of segregation and its effects on cooperation depends foremost on whether and how higher effort levels contribute to societal welfare. The same mechanisms can be employed by some groups to cooperate in enhancing science and emancipation, and at the same time by others to expropriate the poor or support a totalitarian regime.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of the results presented in this paper, and also elaborate on some statements regarding our closed form example.
Proof of Proposition 1
Solving (1) and (2) for v i (ē i ) and w i (ē i ), one obtains
and
Substituting (11) and (12) into the incentive compatibility constraint in (3) , and noting that efficiency implies that the incentive constraint in (3) is satisfied with equality, we obtain after rearranging terms:
Under condition 1, it cannot be excluded that π(e,e) π(0,e) strictly increases with e on some intervals of R + . By efficiency, we select the highest e satisfying (13) by means of the maximum operator in (4) .
This characterization ofē
i is well defined if π satisfies condition 1, as the ratio π(e,e) π(0,e) continuously maps R + on the entire unit interval. First, continuity is implied by the continuous differentiability of π, and π(e,e) π(0,e) ∈ [0, 1] for all e because π 1 ≤ 0 and π (e, e) ≥ 0 for all e, and because π 2 is bounded away from zero. Second, lim e→0 + π(e,e) π(0,e) = 1 by the initial condition. This also means that lim p i →1 −ē i = 0. And third, lim e→∞ π(e,e) π(0,e) = 0 by the boundedness of π (e, e) and because π 2 is bounded away from zero.
Finally, note thatē i decreases continuously with p i , except wherē e i constitutes a local maximum of π(e,e) π(0,e)
. At such point, (4) decreases discontinuously to a lower effort level, such thatē i constitutes left continuous and strictly decreasing function of p i . In a similar fashion,ē i is right continuous and strictly increasing function of δ (1 − λ) .
≥ 0 if and only if,
Which is indeed the condition stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4
To show the result mentioned in the proposition, we need to find a vector of shares (p i ) such that, for all matrices of symbols switching costs, (c (i, j)) i,j , (4) is satisfied for all s i and that the inequality for no-switching of players to other symbols as stated in Proposition 3,
holds. Now, for a vector of equal components, p i = p j = p for all i = j. Consider two different symbols, s i and s j . In that case, it follows from (4) thatē i =ē j and therefore, from (2), it follows thatw i (ē i ) = w j (ē j ), which implies that the inequality in Proposition 3 is satisfied for all (c (i, j)) i,j and hence, we have a valid efficiently segregating PPE. Note that for a unicomponent vector (p i ) = (p, ..., p), the population shares of symbols is obviously uniform 1 S .
Derivation of (7)
We briefly illustrate the derivation of (7). note that after k rounds of equilibrium play, the expected continuation value on the equilibrium path is π (e k , e k ) + δ ((1 − λ) π (e k+1 , e k+1 ) + λπ (e 0 , e 0 )) +δ 
The expected continuation value of cheating in the k-th is π (0, e k ) + δπ (e 0 , e 0 ) + δ 2 ((1 − λ) π (e 1 , e 1 ) + λπ (e 0 , e 0 )) +δ 3 (1 − λ) 2 π (e 2 , e 2 ) + (1 − λ) λπ (e 1 , e 1 ) + λ 2 π (e 0 , e 0 ) +...
Incentive compatibility requires that the difference between (14) and (15) is positive. After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the constraint in (7).
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that players would agree on a non-constant effort plan (e τ ), τ = 0, 1, ..., then if at some point along this plan a certain (high) effort level is viable (i.e. satisfies individual incentive compatibility constraints for both players within the partnership), all efforts in time periods τ for which e τ ≤ e can be reneged to level e. Repeat such argument and conclude that the only (constant) effort that is robust to renegotiation is an efficient effort level. Efficiency, as described in the main text, means exhausting the incentive compatibility constraints for players. Moreover, this argument holds for any > 0. Now, denote such potential effort level byẽ. Let v (ẽ) denote the expected continuation value. Then, v (ẽ) = π (ẽ,ẽ) + δv (ẽ) .
In order forẽ to be incentive compatible and efficient, we should have that:
and therefore, π (0,ẽ) = π (ẽ,ẽ), which can only hold forẽ = 0. Now, consider e (ε) > 0 a positive effort level that is allowed under our criterion of ε-renegotiation proofness. A joint deviation from zero efforts toê (ε) gives the following expected continuation payoff:
v (ê (ε)) = π (ê (ε) ,ê (ε)) 1 − δ(1 − λ) , and incentive compatibility requires that v (ê (ε)) ≥ π (0,ê (ε)) which is clearly viable. The only way to makeẽ = 0 the unique outcome is in the (non-generic) case where δ(1 − λ) = 0. This shows that, generically, there does not exist a symbol-blind equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6
As noted in the main text, ε-renegotiation proofness implies a.o. that the effort levelē i should be efficient, that is, it should exhaust the incentive compatibility constraint as provided in (3). This in turn means that the latter is satisfied with equality. Now, consider a bilateral deviation fromē i in terms of efforts (as there is no deviation from termination or symbol choice decisions), which we will denote byē i (ε). This bilateral deviation provides an expected continuation value which equals π (ē i (ε) ,ē i (ε)) 1 − δ(1 − λ) + δλ 1 − δ(1 − λ) w i ē i , asymmetric deviations (ê i ,ê j ). In caseê i <ê j , by Condition 1, we have that:
and from (19),
Hence, from (20) and (21), it is clear that the s j -player is not willing to deviate in such a heterogeneous partnership. Now, consider the casê e j <ê i . Using Condition 1 again, we obtain:
Applying (19) again, we also have:
Combining inequalities (22) and (23), it follows that the s i -player is not willing to deviate in such a heterogeneous partnership. Therefore, (19) is indeed a sufficient condition to exclude players of exerting positive efforts in heterogeneous partnerships. Lemma 1 shows that w i (ē i ) is decreasing forē i ≥ e * , hence (19) puts an upper bound on the efforts that can be sustained within homogeneous partnerships (in an efficient segregating PPE). Equivalently, (19) implies a lower bound on the shares p i , sayp (ε). Furthermore,p (ε) is increasing as long as (??) is satisfied. In casep (ε) reaches the level p * , then a further increase inp (ε) would lower efforts below e * and as a consequence of Proposition 6 the efficient segregating PPE is no longer viable.
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider an s i and s j player considering a joint deviation. Note that the s j -player can at most exert effort up untilē j (by incentive compatibility), whereas the s i -player can exert efforts at a higher level, until a maximum level ofē i . The (expected) continuation value of a joint deviation to some level e for s i reads:
π (e, e) − ∆ 1 − δ(1 − λ)
Now, let ∆ >∆, where∆ is defined as in (10). The s i -player will not comply to the deviation in case the following inequality is satisfied:
which, after substitution of (24) and using (8) (where the inequality is replaced by an equality) becomes:
(26) Notice that the left hand side of (26) is smaller than∆, hence, as >∆, (26) is satisfied. Furthermore, as only the s i -player can exert higher efforts in an asymmetric deviation, if (26) is fulfilled, then no such asymmetric deviations are viable, as the consequent (expected) continuation value of such asymmetric deviations would be even lower than the corresponding continuation value in the symmetric deviation considered here.
